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Abstract
We view the penalty algorithm of Ceperley and Dewing (1999), a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
algorithm for Bayesian inference, in the context of data privacy. Specifically, we study differential privacy
of the penalty algorithm and advocate its use for data privacy. We show that in the simple model of
independent observations the algorithm has desirable convergence and privacy properties that scale with
data size. Two special cases are also investigated and privacy preserving schemes are proposed for those
cases: (i) Data are distributed among several data owners who are interested in the inference of a common
parameter while preserving their data privacy. (ii) The data likelihood belongs to an exponential family.
1 Introduction
One concern about sharing datasets for use of third parties is violation of privacy of individuals who contribute
to those datasets with their private information. Significant amount of research is devoted to address that
concern by either analysing privacy preserving properties of already existing methods or developing novel
methods that are useful for statistical inference and still preserve data privacy to a quantifiable extent at
the same time.
One popular formulation of data privacy is differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006). Differential privacy
associates a random algorithm with a mapping from the space of data to a space of probability distributions
for the output of the algorithm. It then quantifies the privacy of the algorithm roughly by some ‘difference’
between two probability distributions corresponding to two ‘neighbour’ data sets that differ by only one
entry. This ‘difference’ is expressed by two nonnegative parameters which are typically shown by ǫ and δ,
and the algorithm is said to be (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. Specifically, let A be a random algorithm that
takes input from a set X ⊆ Rn for some n ≥ 1 and produces random outputs in S. Let h(X,Y ) be the edit
distance or Hamming distance between data sets X,Y ∈ X i.e. number of entry-wise differences between X
and Y .
Definition 1. Differential privacy: We call a randomised algorithm A with domain X and range S
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for any measurable set S ⊂ S and for all X,Y ∈ X such that h(X,Y ) ≤ 1, we
1
have
P (A(X) ∈ S) ≤ exp(ǫ)P (A(Y ) ∈ S) + δ.
where A(X) and A(Y ) denotes random outputs of the algorithm using inputs X and Y , respectively. If δ = 0,
then A is called ǫ-differential private.
Obviously, the smaller ǫ and δ are the better privacy is preserved, since smaller ǫ and δ correspond to a
closer match between the probability distributions of A(X) and A(Y ).
1.1 Relevance of Monte Carlo methods
In Bayesian inference, the answer to an unknown parameter of interest is in the form of a probability
distribution, namely the posterior distribution, denoted by π throughout the paper. Monte Carlo methods,
which constitute a great proportion of Bayesian inference methods, are used to generate random samples
either exactly or approximately from π when π is intractable, i.e. it does not have tractable expectations
of certain functions of the parameter of interest. Therefore, by its nature Monte Carlo methods produce
random outputs and that makes them natural candidates for privacy preserving methods.
Arguably the most widely used Monte Carlo method for Bayesian inference is Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) (see Robert and Casella (2004) for example), where one generates a sequence of samples from a
Markov chain that has π as its stationary distribution. Study of MCMC methods in relation to differential
privacy has recently attracted researchers. For example, Wang et al. (2015) presented a modified version
of the stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics algorithm of Welling and Teh (2011) for differential privacy.
Even more recently, Foulds et al. (2016) discussed differential privacy of several MCMC methods.
1.2 Contribution
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on privacy preserving methods by studying differential privacy
of a specific MCMC algorithm, namely the penalty algorithm (Ceperley and Dewing, 1999). The penalty
algorithm is actually an approximation of the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm (Hastings, 1970), one of
the most popular MCMC methods. The approximation is due to the use of the log-acceptance ratio of the
MH algorithm in normally distributed noise with known variance.
A true implementation of the penalty algorithm requires being able to compute the log-acceptance ratio
in the first place. That is why the penalty algorithm has so far been used with approximately normally
distributed estimates of the log-acceptance ratio only when this ratio is intractable. Indeed, without privacy
concerns, it is always favourable to use the log-acceptance ratio rather than its noisy version.
However, in a data privacy setting, the penalty algorithm becomes more relevant and potentially more
useful than the MH algorithm, an observation that has surprisingly escaped attention so far. We advocate
the use of the penalty algorithm for a few reasons:
• The penalty algorithm is an exact algorithm in that its stationary distribution remains π.
• The penalty algorithm deliberately uses noisy functions of data, hence it has desirable privacy preserv-
ing properties.
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• Under certain conditions, the differential privacy as well as convergence properties of the penalty
algorithm scale well with data size.
The first reason is already known (Ceperley and Dewing, 1999; Nicholls et al., 2012); we will justify the last
two in Sections 2 and 3. Specifically, we first show that the penalty algorithm, although inferior to the MH
algorithm that it mimics, can preserve the uniform or geometric ergodicity properties (with slower rates) of
the MH algorithm under some conditions. Then we proceed with the analysis of the differential privacy of
the algorithm and show that the algorithm does have desired privacy properties that scale favourably with
data size. We also investigate the use of the algorithm in a data sharing scenario when data are distributed
among different owners who want to infer the same θ conditional on all the available data .
Our analysis is similar to that in Wang et al. (2015) in that our main theorem (Theorem 1) employs the re-
sults on the so called advanced composition (Dwork et al., 2010) and Gaussian mechanism (Dwork and Roth,
2013). One difference is that the algorithm discussed in Wang et al. (2015) is only asymptotically exact but
computationally scalable in data size due to subsampling; whereas our algorithm preserves the target den-
sity at all iterations but computationally not scalable in data size (unless the posterior distribution has a
convenient form such as the exponential family, which we will discuss further in Section 3.3).
In a recent work by Foulds et al. (2016), differential privacy of certain MCMC methods for exponential
family distributions are studied when they are used with the sufficient statistics of the data modified by
Laplacian noise. The authors show that the proposed methods are asymptotically unbiased in terms of their
target distribution. However, for any finite data size, the algorithms have bias. The penalty method, on the
other hand, remains unbiased and it is applicable to more general distributions than exponential families.
1.3 Outline
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the penalty algorithm for a general
target distribution and we provide some statistical properties of the algorithmmainly in terms of convergence.
The purpose of Section 2 is mainly to assist the analysis in Section 3 where we work out the differential
privacy of the algorithm, specifically we will explain what happens to ǫ and δ of the algorithm as the data
size increases. We conclude in Section 4 with final discussions and a mention to future work.
2 The penalty algorithm
Suppose we are given a target distribution π for variable θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rdθ for some dθ ≥ 1 with probability
density shown by π(θ) and a proposal kernel q with density shown as q(·|θ) for θ ∈ Θ. Under some mild
conditions on q with respect to π, the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm (Hastings, 1970) generates a
reversible Markov chain {θt}t≥0 with invariant density π as follows: Start with θ0; for t ≥ 0, given θt = θ,
propose θ′ ∼ q(·|θ) and set θt+1 = θ′ (or ‘accept’ θ′) with probability
α(θ, θ′) = min {1, r(θ, θ′)} ,
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else set θt+1 = θ
′ (or ‘reject’), where
r(θ, θ′) =
π(θ′)q(θ|θ′)
π(θ)q(θ′|θ) ,
is called the acceptance ratio given the current and proposed values θ and θ′.
The penalty algorithm of Ceperley and Dewing (1999) replaces the logarithm of the acceptance ratio
λ(θ, θ′) := log r(θ, θ′) with an unbiased normal estimate λˆσ(θ, θ
′) with variance σ2(θ, θ′) = σ2(θ′, θ) that
takes its values from a symmetric function σ2 : Θ2 → [0,∞), i.e.
λˆσ(θ, θ
′) ∼ N (λ(θ, θ′), σ2(θ, θ′))
and accepts θ′ with the modified acceptance probability
αˆσ(θ, θ
′) = min {1, rˆσ(θ, θ′)}
where the modified acceptance ratio
rˆσ(θ, θ
′) = exp
(
λˆσ(θ, θ
′)− σ2(θ, θ′)/2
)
has the penalty term σ2(θ, θ′)/2 as a compromise for using an estimate λˆσ(θ, θ
′) instead of λ(θ, θ′).
2.1 Statistical properties
The penalty algorithm has the remarkable property that the Markov chain it generates still has π as its
invariant density, thus the algorithm still targets π; see Ceperley and Dewing (1999) for the original proof
and Nicholls et al. (2012) for an alternative proof that shows that the penalty algorithm is reversible with
respect to π.
Nicholls et al. (2012) also showed (in a more general setting) that using αˆσ(θ, θ
′) is always inferior to
using α(θ, θ′) in the Peskun sense, i.e. for any θ, θ′ the expected acceptance probability
ασ(θ, θ
′) := E [αˆσ(θ, θ
′)] ≤ α(θ, θ′),
which can be verified via Jensen’s inequality. In addition, we show here that in fact the algorithm’s perfor-
mance in the Peskun sense (i.e. ασ(θ, θ
′)) decreases monotonically in σ2(θ, θ′). (A simple proof by working
out the derivative of ασ(θ, θ
′) is given in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1. For any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, ασ(θ, θ′) is a decreasing function of σ2(θ, θ′) ∈ [0,∞).
Denote the transition kernel of the MH algorithm and the corresponding penalty algorithm with variance
σ2(θ, θ′) by T and Tσ, respectively. Despite its (perhaps not surprising) inferiorities that are mentioned
above, Tσ inherits the favourable ergodicity properties of the T under some conditions. The following
proposition on uniform ergodicity is proven in a more general setting in Nicholls et al. (2012); we present it
here specifically for the penalty algorithm for completeness.
Proposition 2. Suppose that supθ,θ′ σ
2(θ, θ′) = B <∞. If the MH algorithm that targets π with proposal q
is uniformly ergodic, then the penalty algorithm that uses σ2(θ, θ′) for the variance of its noise and the same
q for the proposal is also uniformly ergodic.
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Proof. We need to show that the expected acceptance probability of the penalty algorithm satisfies
ασ(θ, θ
′) ≥ κα(θ, θ′) (1)
for some κ > 0 for all θ, θ′. Then we can follow the same steps starting from Equation (6.3) of Nicholls et al.
(2012, Appendix A) to conclude that for any θ ∈ Θ and measurable set E ⊆ Θ we have Tσ(θ, E) ≥ κT (θ, E)
and that since by hypothesis T satisfies a minorisation condition so does Tσ, which leads to uniform ergodicity.
To show (1), let κ = 1 − Φ(B/2), where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of N (0, 1), and observe
that, for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, and V ∼ N (0, 1), we have
P
(
λˆσ(θ, θ
′) ≥ λ(θ, θ′)
)
= P
(
σ(θ, θ′)V − σ2(θ, θ′)/2)
= P (V ≥ σ(θ, θ′)/2)
≥ P (V ≥ B/2)
= 1− Φ(B/2) = κ.
Therefore, by using a decomposition for the expected value, we have
ασ(θ, θ
′) = E [αˆ(θ, θ′)]
≥ E
[
αˆσ(θ, θ
′)
∣∣∣λˆσ(θ, θ′) ≥ λ(θ, θ′)]P (λˆσ(θ, θ′) ≥ λ(θ, θ′))
≥ α(θ, θ′)κ
where the second inequality holds since αˆσ(θ, θ
′) ≥ α(θ, θ′) in the event λˆσ(θ, θ′) ≥ λ(θ, θ′).
Assumption of uniform ergodicity for the MH algorithm can be restrictive. Thus, whether the penalty
algorithm inherits the geometric ergodicity of the MH algorithm (with a slower rate) is worth investigating.
The following lemma, which uses an intermediate result of Proposition 2, will be useful to establish geometric
ergodicity of the penalty algorithm.
Lemma 1. Suppose the MH algorithm targeting π on Θ has the rejection probability function ρ(θ). Also,
suppose the penalty algorithm for π that uses the same proposal kernel and variance σ2 : Θ2 → [0,∞) has
the rejection probability function ρσ(x). If ess sup ρ < 1, the essential supremum being taken with respect to
π, and supθ,θ′ σ
2(θ, θ′) = B <∞, then ess sup ρσ < 1.
Proof. We have shown in Proposition 2 that if supθ,θ′ σ
2(θ, θ′) = B < ∞ then ασ(θ, θ′) ≥ κα(θ, θ′) with
κ = 1− Φ(B/2).
ρσ(θ) = 1−
∫
ασ(θ, θ
′)q(dθ′|θ)
≤ 1− κ
∫
α(θ, θ′)q(dθ′|θ)
= 1− κ(1− ρ(θ))
= (1− κ) + κρ(θ)
Therefore, ess sup ρσ ≤ (1− κ) + κ ess supρ < 1.
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Define the sub-stochastic operator Tσ,a the acceptance part of the kernel for the penalty algorithm, i.e.
for any ϕ ∈ L2(π)
Tσ,aϕ(θ) =
∫
q(dθ′|θ)ασ(θ, θ′)ϕ(θ′)
We give a result on the geometric ergodicity of the penalty method that holds under the assumption that
Tσ,a is compact. (See Atchade´ and Perron (2007) for a discussion on the compactness assumption.)
Proposition 3. Assume Tσ,a is compact. If the MH algorithm targeting π is geometrically ergodic, then the
penalty algorithm using a bounded σ2(θ, θ′) is also geometrically ergodic.
Proof. The geometric ergodicity of the MH algorithm implies ess sup ρ < 1 by Roberts and Tweedie (1996,
Proposition 5.1.). The boundedness of σ2(θ, θ′) gives ess sup ρσ < 1 by Lemma 1. Moreover, we observe that
Tσ is self-adjoint since the penalty algorithm is reversible. These facts can be used to establish the geometric
ergodicity by verifying the steps of Theorem 2.1. of Atchade´ and Perron (2007) for the kernel of the penalty
algorithm.
3 Differential privacy of the penalty algorithm
We have mentioned above that the MH algorithm is superior to the penalty algorithm that mimics it with
an extra noise term. Then, what is the point of using the penalty algorithm in the first place? There are at
least two reasons, the second of which is relevant to data privacy.
1. λ(θ, θ′) may be intractable or too expensive to compute and instead an approximately normal estimate
of it may be used (in which case the resulting algorithm becomes an approximate penalty algorithm in
that the target density is no more π). This is in fact how the algorithm has been used in the literature
so far.
2. Adding noise to λ(θ, θ′) may help with preserving some sort of data privacy in a Bayesian framework
where π, hence λ(θ, θ′), depends on the data to be conditioned on.
The second argument is the main motivation of this paper and needs elaboration with a model that we
will study for the rest of the paper. Suppose that we are interested in Bayesian inference of θ where π is
the posterior distribution given the data y1:n of size n with prior distribution having a probability density
function η,
π(θ) := p(θ|y1:n) ∝ η(θ)p(y1:n|θ),
and the data samples conditional on θ are independent, which leads to the following simple factorisation of
the data likelihood
p(y1:n|θ) =
n∏
t=1
p(yt|θ).
Let us rewrite the logarithm of the acceptance ratio as λn(y1:n, θ, θ
′) = dn(y1:n, θ, θ
′) + log η(θ
′)q(θ|θ′)
η(θ)q(θ′|θ) where
dn(y1:n, θ, θ
′) :=
n∑
t=1
[log p(yt|θ′)− log p(yt|θ)]
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where we include n as well as y1:n in the notation to indicate dependency on data. Assuming calculation
of log η(θ
′)q(θ|θ′)
η(θ)q(θ′|θ) is straightforward, in order to implement the penalty algorithm, one only needs a normally
distributed noisy version of dn(y1:n, θ, θ
′) provided that the variance of the noise is known. Therefore, the
data owner can feed the analyser with the noisy log-acceptance ratio and ensure a certain degree of data
privacy as well as allowing analysis of the data. Another relevant scenario is where the data are shared
among a certain number of users whose common interest is inferring θ and common concern is privacy of
their data against each other. As we will discuss later, the penalty algorithm suggests that those users can
execute a common algorithm by submitting their contributions to the log acceptance ratio in gaussian noise
with known variance.
The important questions to be asked in the scenarios considered above are:
• How should we choose the noise variance σ2n(θ, θ′) to ensure a certain degree of data privacy?
• How does the differential privacy of such schemes scale with data size n?
These questions will be addressed in the rest of this section, mainly by Theorem 1. In the following, we
will investigate the degree to which differential privacy is ensured by enabling implementation of the penalty
algorithm with reasonable convergence properties. We will first give our main result on the differential
privacy of the penalty algorithm. We then provide an interpretation of the result and comment about the
assumptions. Then we will provide a proof of the main result which relies on the concepts of advanced
composition (Dwork et al., 2010) and Gaussian mechanism (Dwork and Roth, 2013).
3.1 Reviewing the penalty algorithm in the privacy context
In order to study the differential privacy of the penalty algorithm, it is useful to view its iterations as a
sequence of database access mechanisms where these mechanisms are (randomly) called upon outside by an
adversary. In particular, we need to introduce the concept of the Gaussian mechanism (Dwork and Roth,
2013). Define the Gaussian mechanism with σ2 > 0 for a function f : X → Rd with some d ≥ 1 to be an
algorithm Aσ : X → Rd which outputs a noisy version of f(X) for input X :
Aσ(X) = fˆ(X) ∼ N (f(X), σ2Id).
For the penalty algorithm, for θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, n ≥ 1 and a non-negative real number σ > 0, we define the
database access mechanism Mθ,θ′,n,σ to be the Gaussian mechanism with variance σ2 for the function
dn(·, θ, θ′) : Yn → R. That is, given the data y1:n, Mθ,θ′,n,σ returns
dˆn,σ(y1:n, θ, θ
′) ∼ N (dn(y1:n, θ, θ′), σ2). (2)
Equation (2) is nothing but the noisy version of the likelihood ratio in the penalty algorithm.
Given the data y1:n, initial value θ0 ∈ Θ and variance σ2n(θ, θ′) = σ2 > 0 for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, let the sequence
of generated samples and proposed samples of the penalty algorithm be {θn,t, t ≥ 1} and {θ′n,t, t ≥ 1}
respectively. Given the current sample θn,t−1 = θ and the proposed sample θ
′
n,t = θ
′, the next iteration of
the penalty algorithm can be viewed as in Algorithm 1:
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Algorithm 1: Iteration t of the penalty method with a database access view
Input: θn,t−1 = θ, θ
′
n,t = θ
′
Output: θn,t, θ
′
n,t+1, dˆn,σ(y1:n, θ, θ
′)
1 The database access mechanism Mθ,θ′,n,σ returns dˆn,σ(y1:n, θ, θ′) as in (2).
2 The adversary decides on θn,t according to the acceptance probability
min
{
1,
η(θ′)qn(θ|θ′)
η(θ)qn(θ′|θ) exp
(
dˆn,σ(y1:n, θ, θ
′)− σ2/2
)}
.
The adversary then samples θ′n,t+1 from qn(·|θn,t).
The view of the adversary using the penalty algorithm targeting πn for k iterations is
{θn,t, θ′n,t, dˆn,σ(y1:n, θn,t−1, θ′n,t); 1 ≤ t ≤ k}.
That is, we consider the scenario in which not only the generated samples but also the estimates of the
log acceptance ratios are observed during the run of the penalty algorithm. For simplicity of the analysis
and emphasis on the contribution of the accept-reject procedure of the penalty algorithm, we will from
here on assume that the proposal distribution qn does not depend on y1:n (more on this assumption later).
Under that assumption, observe that only Step 1 of the above description requires access to data. Therefore,
the differential privacy of the penalty algorithm lies in the differential privacy of a sequence the Gaussian
mechanisms called during the iterations.
3.2 The main result
Denote the joint probability distribution of sampled and proposed variables by Pn,σ,θ0 (y1:n is omitted from
the notation for simplicity) so that for every k ≥ 1
Pn,σ,θ0(dθn,1:k×dθ′n,1:k) =
k∏
t=1
qn(dθ
′
n,t|θn,t−1)
[
ασ(θn,t−1, θ
′
n,t)δθ′n,t(dθn,t) + (1 − ασ(θn,t−1, θ′n,t))δθn,t−1(dθn,t)
]
Our main theorem requires the following assumption on the structure of the log-likelihood together with the
choice of the proposal density to hold Pn,σ,θ0-a.s.
Assumption A1. For all θ ∈ Θ, there exists an α > 0 such that ∇2dn(·, θ, θ′) ≤ cn−α Pn,σ,θ0-a.s., where
the ℓ2 sensitivity ∇2f of the function f : X → Rd for some d ≥ 1 is defined as
∇2f = sup
x,y∈X :h(x,y)≤1
||f(x) − f(y)||2.
Theorem 1 states the number of iterations allowed to have a (ǫ, δ) differential privacy with its ǫ and δ
parameters having desirable orders of magnitude, which are O(1) and o(1/n), respectively (see the discussion
in Dwork and Roth (2013, Section 2.3)).
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Theorem 1. Assume A1 with some c > 0 and α > 0. For every β > 0, k0 > 0 and θ0 ∈ Θ, there exists
some σ2 > 0 such that it holds Pn,σ,θ0-a.s. that the k(n) = ⌊k0n2α/ log(n)⌋ iterations of the penalty algorithm
targeting πn and using σ
2
n(θ, θ
′) = σ2 is (ǫn,k(n), δn,k(n))-differentially private where
ǫn,k(n) ≤ 2
√
k0(2α+ β)β
c
σ
+ 4k0
c2
σ2
(2α+ β) (3)
δn,k(n) ≤ 1.25k0n−β/ log(n) + n−β. (4)
In particular, for β > 1, we have ǫn,k(n) = O(1) and δn,k(n) = o(1/n).
Remarks: Theorem 1 is useful due to its explicit expressions for k(n), ǫn,k(n), and δn,k(n). (It is possible to
read (3) and (4) as equalities, since if an algorithm is (ǫ, δ) differentially private, it is also (ǫ′, δ′) differentially
private for ǫ′ > ǫ and δ′ > δ.) Specifically, it provides the order of how many iterations the penalty algorithm
should be run and what σ2 should be taken to achieve a given degree of differential privacy. In particular,
we are interested in ǫn,k(n) = O(1) and δn,k(n) = o(1/n) since those are the desired orders for the algorithm
to be meaningfully private, see the discussion in Dwork and Roth (2013, Section 2.3).
What the theorem suggests is that by tuning the free parameters k0 and β we can obtain a ‘scalable’
differential privacy for a non-decreasing (in fact, increasing for large n) number of iterations of the penalty
algorithm whose variance does not increase with n. Note that while α and c depend on the model at hand,
we have the freedom choose k0, β. A realistic value for α is 0.5, as we will discuss in Section 3.2.1 also.
The depicted scenario in which we observe the noisy log-likelihood ratio dˆn,σ(y1:n, θ, θ
′) will be more
relevant when we discuss the use of the penalty algorithm in a data sharing scenario. In the absence of such
a case, one can consider instead a scenario where the view of the adversary is only the posterior samples
and the proposed samples θn,t, θ
′
n,t, t ≥ 1, or even only the posterior samples θn,t, t ≥ 1. In such a scenario,
we can still use (ǫn,k(n), δn,k(n)) to describe the differential privacy of the such a scheme. This is because
once dˆn,σ(y1:n, θ, θ
′) is calculated, the accept-reject step and the proposal step can be seen as random post-
processing steps that do not require any access to data. This can only result in an algorithm whose differential
privacy after k(n) iterations is less than or equal to that (ǫn,k(n), δn,k(n)) given in (3) and (4).
Proof of the main result: The following theorem by Dwork and Roth (2013) on the Gaussian mechanism
plays a significant role in establishing the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. (Gaussian mechanism) Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary. The Gaussian mechanism for function
f with σ > ∇2f
√
2 log(1.25/δ)/ǫ is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
The function f relevant to the penalty algorithm is the dn(·; θ, θ′) : Yn → R’s, i.e. the difference of log
likelihood functions, when considered as functions of data samples. We need to cite one more theorem about
differential privacy, regarding what happens when a sequence of database access mechanisms with a certain
differential privacy is applied (Dwork et al., 2010).
Theorem 3. (Advanced composition) For all ǫ, δ, δ′ ≥ 0, the class of (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mecha-
nisms satisfies (ǫ′, kδ + δ′)-differential privacy under k-fold adaptive composition for:
ǫ′ =
√
2k log(1/δ′)ǫ+ kǫ(eǫ − 1).
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The structure of Algorithm 1 suggests that the penalty algorithm can be seen as a k-fold adaptive
composition, where a database access mechanism with a certain differential privacy is called. This, combined
with Theorems 2 and 3 facilitates the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. (Theorem 1)
Let β′ = 2α+ β and pick a finite σ > 0 that satisfies
σ > max
n≥1
cn−α
√
2β′ logn. (5)
which is possible since the right hand side is finite for each α > 0. Next, let Dc,α,n,σ = {Mθ,θ′,n,σ :
∇2dn(·, θ, θ′) < cn−α} be a family of the Gaussian mechanisms where Mθ,θ′,n,σ was defined earlier. Then,
Theorem 2 implies that each mechanism in Dc,α,n,σ is (ǫ, δ)-DP where
ǫ =
c
σ
n−α
√
2β′ logn, δ = 1.25n−β
′
since σ > cn−α
√
2β′ logn by (5), hence satisfying the condition of Theorem 2.
Furthermore, by Theorem 3, we see that for δ′n > 0 and k ≥ 1, Dc,α,n,σ satisfies (ǫn,k, δn,k)-DP under
k-fold adaptive composition
ǫn,k ≤
√
4kβ′ logn log(1/δ′n)
c
σ
n−α + 2k
c2
σ2
n−2α2β′ logn, δn,k = 1.25kn
−β′ + δ′n.
where we used eǫ − 1 ≤ 2ǫ since ǫ < 1 (as noted by Wang et al. (2015) also). Now, substituting δ′n = n−β
and k = k(n) = ⌊k0n2α/ log(n)⌋, we have
ǫn,k(n) ≤ 2
√
k0β′β
c
σ
+ 4k0
c2
σ2
β′
δn,k(n) ≤ 1.25k0n−β/ log(n) + n−β.
We conclude the proof by substituting β′ = 2α+ β and pointing out that by Assumption A1 each iteration
of the penalty algorithm targeting πn accesses data via a mechanism from Dc,α,n,σ Pn,σ,θ0-a.s.
3.2.1 On the assumptions about the proposal density
Although Assumption A1 is not easy to verify, the following two assumptions are more testable and they
together imply A1.
Assumption A2. The derivative with respect to θ of the log-likelihood ℓ(y, θ) exists and for all y ∈ Y it is
bounded by M in absolute value
sup
y∈Y,θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∂ℓ(y, θ)∂θ(i)
∣∣∣∣ ≤M, i = 1, . . . , dθ.
Assumption A3. There exists an α > 0 and c > 0 such that for all n ≥ 1 we have |θ′n,t(i)−θn,t−1(i)| < cn−α
Pn,σ,θ0-a.s. for all i = 1, . . . , dθ.
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Assumption A2 can hold for compact sets for θ and y and Assumption A3 can be forced, for example,
with a truncated random walk. Assumptions A2 and A3 imply Assumption A1, since
|ℓ(y, θ′)− ℓ(y, θ)| ≤
dθ∑
i=1
|θ′(i)− θ(i)|M
by the zeroth order Taylor polynomial approximation and therefore ∇2dn(·, θ, θ′) ≤ 2dθn−αM . For Assump-
tion A3 to be compatible with desirable convergence properties for the algorithm, we would need α ≤ 0.5,
since for any α > 0.5 the proposal moves would have too short of a range and this would cause the penalty
algorithm to collapse as n→∞.
A restrictive assumption we made about qn is its independence from the data y1:n. This can be suboptimal
when compared to schemes that exploiting the gradient of the posterior πn that can only be extracted by
using the data. We made the independence assumption merely for emphasising on the differential privacy
brought by the Gaussian mechanism that is naturally a part of the penalty algorithm. When qn depends
on the data, sampling from qn should be seen as a database access mechanism and therefore the analysis of
Algorithm 1 should consider the differential privacy of the proposal step as well. Taking this into account,
any proposal scheme whose differential privacy at one iteration is as good as the Gaussian mechanism is
welcome, since such a scheme will not distort the order of ǫn,k(n) and δn,k(n) but will only double these
quantities in the worst case.
3.2.2 Differential privacy of the penalty algorithm in a data sharing context
Consider a scenario where the available data y1:n is shared amongN data owners (sharers) who are commonly
interested in inferring the common parameter θ using all the data available. Let the portion of the data
shared by sharer i be y(i) of size ni, with n1 + . . .+ nN = n, so that y1:n = (y
(1), . . . , y(N)). Suppose these
sharers want to implement a penalty algorithm together that targets πn as well as guarantees a certain
differential privacy for each sharer against the other sharers. In other words, for each sharer all the other
sharers are adversaries. This is possible if each sharer contributes to the log-acceptance with added noise.
Specifically, given θ, θ′ ∈ Θ as the current and proposed values in an iteration of the penalty algorithm, the
contribution of user i shall be
dˆ(i)n,σ(y
(i), θ, θ′) ∼ N (dni(y(i), θ, θ′), σ2). (6)
The steps of this algorithm can be written as in Algorithm 2. The view of the adversaries (which are data
Algorithm 2: Iteration t of the penalty method within a data sharing context
1 For i = 1, . . . , N , user i returns its contribution in noise, dˆ
(i)
n,σ(y(i), θ, θ′) as in (6).
2 θn,t is decided on according to the acceptance probability
min
{
1,
η(θ′)qn(θ|θ′)
η(θ)qn(θ′|θ) exp
(
N∑
i=1
dˆ(i)n,σ(y
(i), θ, θ′)−Nσ2/2
)}
.
Then the proposal θ′n,t+1 is sampled from qn(·|θn,t) for the next iteration.
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sharers at the same time) using the penalty algorithm targeting πn for k iterations is
{θn,t, θ′n,t, dˆ(i)n,σ(y(i), θn,t−1, θ′n,t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ t ≤ k}.
Note that the ℓ2 sensitivity of the function that each data sharer reveals in noise is the same as in Section
3.2. Therefore, with the same σ2, the result for differential privacy in Theorem 1 applies for the differential
privacy of each user. However, there is a cost to pay: The total variance variance in the log-acceptance ratio
is now Nσ2 instead of σ2 which slows down the mixing of the chain of the penalty algorithm and makes it
worse in Peskun sense. However, if N does not increase with n, Algorithm 2 is viable since then the variance
of the total noise in the algorithm will increase not with n.
3.3 Exponential families
A broad and useful family of distributions for the likelihood are exponential family distributions where the
likelihood of the data given θ is written as
p(y|θ) = h(y)g(θ) exp[ϕ(θ)TS(y)]
where S(y) is a dϕ × 1 vector of sufficient statistics of y, ϕ(θ) is the dϕ × 1 vector of natural parameters of
the model, and h(y) is the normalising constant. For the i.i.d. model with n data samples, the logarithm of
the ratio of log-likelihoods at θ and θ′ becomes
dn(y1:n, θ, θ
′) = n[log g(θ′)− log g(θ)] + [ϕ(θ′)− ϕ(θ)]TSn(y1:n) (7)
where Sn(y1:n) =
∑n
i=1 S(yi).
Obviously, the previously discussed settings and stated results also hold for exponential family distribu-
tions; however, exponential families enable an alternative and simpler way of sharing data in privacy: As
one can see from (7), a noisy version of dn(y1:n, θ, θ
′) can be provided by providing a noisy version of the
sufficient statistic Sn(y1:n). In order to implement the penalty algorithm for k iterations, k independent
noisy versions of Sn(y1:n) will be revealed by the data owner, i.e.
Sˆ
(t)
n,ξ(y1:n)
i.i.d.∼ N (Sn,σ(y1:n), ξnId), t = 1, . . . , k.
The resulting log-ratio of likelihood is then
dˆn,ξ(y1:n, θ, θ
′) = n[log g(θ′)− log g(θ)] + [ϕ(θ′)− ϕ(θ)]T Sˆn(y1:n)
It can be checked that variance of dˆn,ξ(y1:n, θ, θ
′) can be written as
σ2n(θ, θ
′) = [ϕ(θ′)− ϕ(θ)]T [ϕ(θ′)− ϕ(θ)]ξn. (8)
The resulting penalty algorithm for exponential families is given in Algorithm 3. Note that unlike the method
in Foulds et al. (2016) which adds noise to Sn(y1:n) only once and then processes it, the penalty algorithm
requires independent noisy sufficient statistics as many as the number of iterations it runs for. Another
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Algorithm 3: Iteration t of the penalty method for exponential families
Input: θn,t−1 = θ, θ
′
n,t = θ
′
Output: θn,t, θ
′
n,t+1, Sˆn,ξ(y1:n)
1 The database access mechanism returns and independent Sˆn,σ(y1:n) ∼ N (Sn,ξ(y1:n), ξnId) as in (2).
2 The adversary calculates σ2n(θ, θ
′) = [ϕ(θ′)− ϕ(θ)]T [ϕ(θ′)− ϕ(θ)]ξn and decides on θn,t according to
the acceptance probability
min
{
1,
η(θ′)qn(θ|θ′)
η(θ)qn(θ′|θ) exp
(
dˆn,ξ(y1:n, θ, θ
′)− σ2n(θ, θ′)/2
)}
.
The adversary then samples θ′n,t+1 from qn(·|θn,t).
difference from the work of Foulds et al. (2016) is that their method is only asymptotically unbiased in
terms of the target distribution whereas the penalty method is always unbiased.
There are two computation-wise important observations for Algorithm 3. Firstly, the database access
mechanism is much simpler than the general case since it returns independent noisy versions of the same
quantity. Secondly, unlike for general models, the computation load does not grow with n for exponential
families.
Differential privacy of k iterations of Algorithm 3 can be computed using Theorems 2 and 3 once we
know the l2 sensitivity of S:
∇2S = sup
x,y∈Y
||S(x)− S(y)||2
On one hand, due to convergence issues discussed in Section 2.1, it is important to keep σ2n(θ, θ) non-
increasing with n. On the other hand, σ2n(θ, θ
′) should be large enough to satisfy differential privacy for
sufficiently many iterations. Fortunately, Corollary 1 shows that we can do these two things at the same
time under Assumption A4 which is essentially the counterpart of Assumption A1.
Assumption A4. There exists an α > 0 and c > 0 such that for all n ≥ 1 we have |ϕ(θ′n,t)− ϕ(θn,t−1)| <
cn−α Pn,σ,θ0-a.s.
Again, counterparts of Assumptions A2 and A3 on ϕ and qn can be made to verify Assumption A4, we
do not give them here to avoid repetition.
Corollary 1. Assume A4 with some c > 0 and α > 0. For every β > 0, k0 > 0 and θ0 ∈ Θ, there exists
some σ2 > 0 such that it holds Pn,σ,θ0-a.s. that the k(n) = k0n
2α/ log(n) iterations of Algorithm 3 targeting
πn and using ξn = σ
2(∇2S)2n2α/c2 is (ǫn,k(n), δn,k(n))-differentially private where ǫn,k(n) and δn,k(n) are
given in (3) and (4), respectively. Moreover, the variance of the noise used in the algorithm is bounded: for
all n ≥ 1, θ, θ′ ∈ Θ σ2n(θ, θ′) ≤ (∇2S)2σ2.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1. Let β′ = 2α + β and pick a finite σ > 0 such that
maxn≥1 cn
−α
√
2β′ logn. The Gaussian mechanism that returns Sˆn,ξ with ξn = σ
2(∇2S)2n2α/c2 is (ǫ, δ)-DP
where ǫ = cσn
−α
√
2β′ logn and δ = 1.25n−β
′
by Theorem 2. The rest of the proof for differential privacy is
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the same as in the proof of Theorem 1. The bound for σ2n(θ, θ
′) should be obvious from the choice made for
ξn, equation (8) and Assumption A4.
4 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper arises from the simple observation that the penalty algorithm has a
built-in noise in its calculations which is not desirable in any other context but can be exploited for data
privacy. We have shown that, without letting the variance of the noise increase and hence convergence
properties of the algorithm degrade with increasing data size, the differential privacy of the algorithm can
scale well with data size. The penalty algorithm has the advantage over the other Bayesian methods for
differential privacy in the sense that it is always unbiased in terms of its target distribution.
Our analysis uses the fact that at each iteration a database access mechanism with the same differential
privacy is called upon. This is necessary for employing Theorem 3 on advanced composition. It would be
worth studying what happens when mechanisms with different (but characterisable) differential privacies are
called sequentially. This would help us relax our assumption on the bounded sensitivity of the difference of
the log-likelihood.
We have already stated that our algorithm preserves the target density at all iterations but computa-
tionally not scalable in data size (unless the posterior distribution has a convenient form such as exponential
families). A computationally scalable version of a privacy preserving penalty algorithm can be developed
via subsampling, but this will introduce bias in the target density that may vanish asymptotically in data
size under some conditions. This is in fact the topic of an unpublished work carried out by the author (in
collaboration).
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A Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 1) Dropping θ, θ′ from the notation, we will show that the derivative of ασ w.r.t. σ is
strictly negative.
ασ =
∫ ∞
−∞
min{1, exp(r + σx− σ2/2)}φ(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
σ/2−r/σ
φ(x)dx +
∫ σ/2−r/σ
−∞
exp(r + σx − σ2/2)φ(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
σ/2−r/σ
φ(x)dx + exp(r)
∫ −σ/2−r/σ
−∞
φ(x)dx
where φ is the probability density of the standard normal distribution. Now,
dασ
dσ
= −φ(σ/2− r/σ)(0.5 + r/σ2) + exp(r)φ(−σ/2 − r/σ)(−0.5 + r/σ2)
= −φ(σ/2− r/σ)(0.5 + r/σ2) + φ(σ/2− r/σ)(−0.5 + r/σ2)
= −φ(σ/2− r/σ)
which is negative.
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